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Abstract: This article explores the cooperation of government and the private
sector to tackle the ethical dimension of artificial intelligence (AI). The argument
draws on the institutionalist approach in philosophy and business ethics
defending a ‘division of moral labor’ between governments and the private sector
(Rawls 2001; Scheffler and Munoz-Dardé 2005). The goal and main contribution of
this article is to explain how this approach can provide ethical guidelines to the AI
industry and to highlight the limits of self-regulation. In what follows, I discuss
three institutionalist claims. First, principles of AI ethics should be validated
through legitimate democratic processes. Second, compliance with these princi-
ples should be secured in a stable way. Third, their implementation in practice
should be as efficient as possible. If we accept these claims, there are good reasons
to conclude that, inmany cases, governments implementing hard regulation are in
principle (if not yet in practice) the best instruments to secure an ethical devel-
opment of AI systems. Where adequate regulation exists, firms should respect the
law. But when regulation does not yet exist, helping governments build adequate
regulation should be businesses’ ethical priority, not self-regulation.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, business ethics, division of moral labor, political
CSR, regulation
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) has seen interesting developments in the last decades. To
illustrate the relevance of these developments, think about Google’s DeepMind
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defeating Lee Sedol, the best human player of Go, with their program AlphaGo in
2015. The latest version of the program, AlphaZero, is remarkable in that it was
designed to learn how to play Go entirely by itself, with only the rules of the game,
through trial and error, and playing millions of games against itself. While the pro-
gram DeepBlue, which defeated Garry Kasparov at Chess in 1997, had been pro-
grammed by human beings to know which moves to make in every situation,
AlphaZero used deep reinforcement learning to essentially learn how to play Go by
itself from scratch. This is one example of the potential of machine learning algo-
rithms that can also be used to solve more practical problems, such as image
recognition inmedical diagnostics andefficient energymanagement (Hassabis 2018).
Today, AI systems are increasingly used by governments and businesses to
help make a range of difficult decisions, from an individual’s eligibility for gov-
ernment benefits and prison sentences in the judicial system to content modera-
tion on Facebook (LeCun 2020; Zimmermann, Di Rosa, and Kim 2020). They also
have the potential to disrupt labor markets by fueling a new wave of automation
(Stiglitz 2018). Yet, AI may not raise fundamentally new ethical challenges and
some underline that the technology itself is neutral, only the way we choose to use
it determines its good or bad effects (Hassabis 2018). While this may be true to a
large extent, we still need to think about how to use this new technological tool
ethically. What kind of ethical values should be embedded in the design of
decision-making algorithms? How should individual privacy be protected, given
the amount of personal data often required to train AI systems? How should ma-
chine learning algorithms be prevented from reproducing societal biases existing
in their training data, which could lead them to discriminate against marginalized
groups? How should the economic impact of automation be mitigated when a
variety of skilled and unskilled jobs are at risk of becoming obsolete? These
questions ask for an answer and responsible action from governments and busi-
nesses (Dubber, Pasquale, and Das 2020).
This article explores the cooperation of government and the private sector to
tackle the ethical dimension of AI. The argument draws on the institutionalist
approach in philosophy and business ethics defending a ‘division of moral labor’
between governments and the private sector (Rawls 2001; Scheffler and Munoz-
Dardé 2005). The goal and main contribution of this article is to explain how this
approach can provide ethical guidelines to the AI industry and to highlight the
limits of self-regulation. In what follows, I discuss three institutionalist claims.
First, principles of AI ethics should be validated through legitimate democratic
processes. Second, compliance with these principles should be secured in a stable
way. Third, their implementation in practice should be efficient. I argue that, if we
accept these claims, there are good reasons to conclude that, in many cases,
governments implementing “hard” regulation are in principle (if not yet in
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practice) the best instruments to secure an ethical development of AI systems.
Where adequate regulation exists, firms should respect the law. But when regu-
lation does not yet exist, I argue that helping governments build adequate regu-
lation should be businesses’ ethical priority, not self-regulation.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the institutionalist
approach and the idea of a division of moral labor between governments and
private agents. In Section 3, I discuss three institutionalist arguments in favor of
tackling the ethical dimension of AI through hard regulation, not self-regulation.
These arguments are based on the principles of legitimacy, stability, and effi-
ciency. In Section 4, I discuss the objection of ‘justice failure’ in non-ideal cir-
cumstances, when governments fail at regulating technology. Under these
circumstances, I argue that businesses’ priority should be helping governments
build adequate regulation and that self-regulation should only be a last resort.
2 Institutionalists and the Division of Moral Labor
A key insight from leading liberal philosophers of the late 20th century such as
John Rawls is that themoral principles that should guide our personal lives are not
necessarily the same as the political principles that should guide social life. The
reason is that we live in pluralistic societies in which people have different moral
beliefs, preferences, and interests. Therefore, while we should be free to live our
personal life according to our own beliefs, institutions regulating social coopera-
tion such as governments, the judicial system, or market regulations, should abide
by ‘public’ standards of justice. These public standards should not derive from one
single, comprehensive conception of morality but from an agreement acceptable
by all, despite moral disagreements. Moreover, these public standards should not
concern our personal lives but only institutions dealing with social conflicts
(Porter 2009; Rawls 2001). A consequence of this separation between the ‘moral’
and the ‘political’, and of the need for political agreement, is that neither my
personal moral beliefs nor yours should ever prevail in a just society. Only the
principles we can agree on should.
Yet, despite pluralism and fundamental disagreements about moral values,
partners involved in a given society have a shared interest in preserving social
cooperation because it is mutually beneficial. This is at least one common ground
onwhich to build compromise and to establish rules that everyone could agree on.
Such rules can only foster stable agreement if they are the product of decision
procedures perceived by all as legitimate and treating everyone fairly. Rawls hopes
that people can reach an overlapping consensus about social rules: If each person
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can find, in their own value system, a reason to agree on a set of principles of
justice, then the agreement will be stable over time (Rawls 2001; Wenar 2017).
Authors in this liberal tradition such as JohnRawls and Samuel Scheffler argue
for a division of moral labor (or an institutional division of labor) between gov-
ernments and private agents in the effort to realize a just society. In this view,
governments should be in charge of validating principles of justice and imple-
menting regulations to organize social cooperation. Once just regulations have
been implemented, individuals and businesses simply have to follow the rules
(e.g. vote, pay their taxes, stop at red lights, etc.) and their social obligations are
fulfilled. This allows us to lead our lives as we see fit and frees us from the constant
worry of doing what is right. For Scheffler, “the idea of a division of moral labour is
best understood as the expression of a strategy for accommodating diverse
values.” He continues: “the idea of a division of moral labour embodies a strategy
for resolving the tensions to which pluralism gives rise. If social institutions are
designed in conformity with the principles of justice, then, it suggests, individual
conduct within those institutions may legitimately be responsive to the various
norms and ideals that govern our personal lives and interpersonal relationships”
(Scheffler and Munoz-Dardé 2005, p. 229, p. 250; see also Porter 2009).
In this institutionalist approach to justice, governments are assumed to be the
primary agents in charge of realizing a just society (Rawls 2001; Scheffler and
Munoz-Dardé 2005; Scherer and Palazzo 2011). Secondary agents like individuals
and businesses are expected to contribute only through proper public channels
and to follow the law. For O’Neill (2001, p. 180) “there are often implicit as-
sumptions that the primary agents of justice are states, and that all other agents or
agencies are secondary agents of justice, whosemain contribution to justicewill be
achieved by conforming to the just requirements of states.” The assumption is that
democratic administrations have the legitimacy, coercive power, and infrastruc-
ture required to enforce regulation and coordinate large-scale collective action
(Friedman 1970; Rawls 2001; Scheffler andMunoz-Dardé 2005; Yeung, Howes, and
Pogrebna 2020). Individualist approaches to justice, by contrast, do not deny the
role of institutions but hold that businesses and individuals can also contribute to
bringing about justice on their own (Berkey 2016; Murphy 1999; O’Neill 2001;
Porter 2009; Weinberg 2009). In business ethics, this belief underlies many the-
ories of corporate social responsibility (CSR) holding that firms should sometimes
self-regulate and take on social responsibilities beyond what is required by law
(Berkey 2016; Freeman 1984; Moriarty 2016). Some argue that managers should
voluntarily supervise their firm’s supply chain to prevent human rights violations
or, in the case of AI, that they should develop safe AI systems aligned with societal
values (Gabriel 2020). This is particularly relevant with new technologies because,
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until regulations are updated, businesses seem to have no choice but to self-
regulate.
The goal of this article is to draw on the existing institutionalist approach and
the idea of the division of moral labor to explain how this approach can provide
ethical guidelines to private actors in the AI industry and to give a response to the
individualist approach inAI ethicswhich focuses on industry self-regulation.More
specifically, I will explain why the institutionalist approach prioritizes “hard”
regulation by governments over “soft” or “self” regulation, in many cases, and
apply these arguments to some cases in AI ethics. The institutionalist argument on
which this article will draw can be summarised as follows:
Premise 1: Realizing a just society as quickly as possible should be everyone’s
ethical priority.
Premise 2: Governments, in many cases, are the best means to realize a just
society because they are in principlemore legitimate, stable, and efficient than
alternatives.
Premise 3: Using suboptimal means delays justice at best and sustains
injustice at worse.
Premise 4: Therefore, in many cases, helping governments build adequate
regulation should be the ethical priority of all private agents, including
businesses.
The first premise 1 is an assumption that I do not discuss in this article. In a liberal
framework, while everyone is free to lead their lives according to their own moral
beliefs, everyone also has a duty to help establish and maintain just institutions
because failing at doing so would perpetuate injustices (Rawls 1971, p. 115; Rawls
2001, p. 201). I will explain in detail the next two premises to provide guidance to
private actors in the AI industry. Premise 2 claims that governments, in many
cases, are in principle the best instruments to realize a just society. This disputes
the idea underlying some individualist conceptions that “private governance
systems might ultimately challenge existing state-centered authority and public
policy-making processes” (Cashore 2002, p. 503). This premise 2 is supported by
three institutionalist arguments based on the principles of legitimacy, stability,
and efficiency. I will illustrate how these arguments apply to important issues in AI
ethics and why, in these cases, governments are “in principle” better than private
agents at realizing justice. I respond to the objection of “justice failure” in non-
ideal circumstances in the last section. The conclusion remains that the best option
to realize justice is often to implement adequate public regulation and that gov-
ernments should not be supplanted by private governance systems.
Indeed, as premise 3 underlines, using suboptimal means to realize a just
society delays justice at best and sustains injustice at worse. This premise disputes
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the received idea that public regulation and individual initiative are always
complementary and that individuals can choose whatever means they prefer. For
example, LiamMurphy objects to premise 3: “it is obviously true that, as a practical
matter, it is overwhelmingly preferable that justice be promoted through institu-
tional reform rather than through the uncoordinated efforts of individuals”
(Murphy 1999, p. 252) but for him, it cannot be right that “justice requires [a person]
to promote just institutions even if she is sure that the aim of the just institutions
she is promoting would be better served if she herself pursued that aim directly”
(Murphy 1999, p. 281; see also Berkey 2016; Porter 2009). Murphy is right only if
justice is indeed better served by individual action in some cases. I argue that this is
rarely true because of opportunity costs: If individuals chose suboptimal means to
contribute to justice, the rightmeasures can be delayed and precious resources can
bewasted, which is ultimately detrimental to justice. Therefore, premise 4, helping
governments build adequate regulation should be the ethical priority of private
agents, including AI businesses.
The main contribution of this article is not to justify the institutionalist
approach (this is achieved in Rawls 2001; Scheffler and Munoz-Dardé 2005) but to
explain how it can provide guidelines in important cases of AI ethics. I am not
claiming that the narrow arguments in AI ethics cases establish the general truth of
the institutionalist approach in all ethical cases nor that the general truth of the
institutionalist approach is the reason why its arguments are convincing in all
cases. I am only explaining the institutionalist arguments of legitimacy, stability,
and efficiency and why, at least in some important AI ethics cases, this approach
seems convincing and action-guiding. This can already be of interest for practi-
tioners in the AI industry seeking ethical guidance on the best way to develop AI
responsibly. Another contribution is to illustrate the appeal of the institutionalist
approach through some revealing cases in AI ethics. While the institutionalist
approach may not be relevant in all business ethics cases, the specific cases of AI
ethics discussed in this article illustrate why this approach can be relevant in these
and similar cases. This can be of interest for researcherswondering about the scope
of the institutionalist approach.
3 Three Arguments for Public Regulation: Cases in
AI Ethics
In this section, I present institutionalist arguments supporting premise 2, ac-
cording to which governments, in many cases, are in principle the best means to
realize a just society. This premise relies on the claims that the principles of justice,
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and of AI ethics in particular, should be validated and scrutinized through legit-
imate democratic processes, that compliance to these principles should be secured
in a stable way, and that their implementation in practice should be as efficient as
possible. In what follows, I explain each of these claims and why they lead to the
conclusion that, in many cases, helping governments build adequate regulation
should be businesses’ ethical priority. In each case, I argue that these arguments
are relevant to thinking about some important cases in AI ethics.
3.1 Legitimacy and AI Value-Sensitive Design
There is a growing call for a “value-sensitive design” of AI systems. Indeed, when
they are used to automate decisions involving value judgments, moral values
must be embedded in AI systems. This can happen either when choosing which
goal the system must optimize or, in a supervised learning process, when engi-
neers tell the algorithm what right or wrong decisions are (Yeung, Howes, and
Pogrebna 2020; Zimmermann, Di Rosa, and Kim 2020). Therefore, some
reasonably argue that AI systems should be designed with values that “align”
with societal values (Gabriel 2020).
Case: The challenge of such “value alignment” can be illustrated in the case of
content moderation on social media. Facebook uses AI systems and machine
learning to improve content moderation. Every single post or picture published on
the platform is filtered through hierarchical neural networks to recognize the
content of the post or picture and decide whether to show it or take it down (often,
in ambiguous cases, with the help of human content moderators). For example, AI
systems are trained to detect and take down terrorist propaganda, false accounts
used to disseminate fake news, online harassment, and hate speech. There are
obvious advantages to automating this process since it can improve the scale,
speed, and accuracy of content moderation while reducing the psychological
burden on human moderators. Yet, in doing so, AI systems make controversial
moral judgments regarding what is “acceptable” or “unacceptable” speech
(Gorwa, Binns, and Katzenbach 2020; LeCun 2020).
The problem is that “removing content which is not universally agreed to be
harmful can… undermine users’ freedom of expression” (Cambridge Consultants
2019, p. 5; Gorwa, Binns, and Katzenbach 2020). Given the power of social media
platforms today and their critical role in amplifying or censoring speech at scale,
some argue that platforms should respect free speech principles that align with
societal values to secure a fair marketplace of ideas (Lambrecht 2020; Llansó et al.
2020; Sander 2020).While filtering out terrorist propaganda anddirect incitation to
violence, against which legislation already exists,may bemorally uncontroversial,
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other cases are more controversial. Examples include filtering out political judg-
ments about a politician’s fitness for office, satirical cartoons that some judge
blasphemous or offensive, or depictions of nudity or violence in art or photo-
journalism (Cambridge Consultants 2019).
In these cases, Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg claimed until very recently
that “Facebook shouldn’t be the arbiter of truth of everything that people say
online” (McCarthy 2020). However, its current content policy seems controversial:
“Facebook has been criticised for removing an image of a statue of Neptune in
Bologna, Italy for being sexually explicit and the iconic photograph of a young girl
fleeing a napalm bombing during the Vietnam War for showing child nudity”
(Cambridge Consultants 2019, p. 5). Nevertheless, Facebook’s Chief AI scientist
Yann LeCun gives weight to the idea that the company should not be the arbiter of
truth when it comes to controversial moral judgments and political opinions. He
stresses that defining “hate speech”, “valid” interpretations of facts, or the
boundary between forms of expression that are “acceptable” and ones that
“should be suppressed” is not a technological question with any technical fix.
These are ethical questions that should be debated by a diverse and independent
press and by civil society. Therefore, in a polarized political landscape in which
Facebook’s non-neutrality is a widespread worry on all political sides, the fact that
Facebook has the power to impose your moral values on everyone and to shut
down your political opponent does not mean that it should (LeCun 2020). The
worry, of course, is that Facebook could use such power, not for the public good,
but for misguided or self-interested purposes.
Institutionalist argument: The important point from an institutionalist
perspective is that the principles of justice and, in our case, the principles of
content moderation that Facebook should implement should be selected through
legitimate decision procedures that everyone can agree on. Governments are, in
many cases, the best agents to realize this end. The argument is that they are in
principle better than private agents (even when well-intentioned) at building
democratic deliberation mechanisms that can lead to legitimate compromises
between people or groups with conflicting moral views.
Indeed, in pluralistic societies, wemust expectmoral disagreements about the
right content moderation policy and reaching a workable compromise between
citizens requires consensus-building strategies. The first and easiest strategy is to
let everyone freely pursue their own beliefs, at least when their behavior does not
affect anyone else. This is one reason justifying the liberal presumption of freedom
and “against legal restrictions” (Rawls 2001, p. 44). A second consensus-building
strategywhen personal behavior can affect others is to seek an agreement between
the people affected. The problem is that, in pluralistic societies, we cannot expect
to base this agreement on the “right” moral answer, nor should we impose the
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values of one group on everyone because this would lead to conflicts. A solution is
to reach an agreement on a decision procedure that everyone accepts as fair. This is
an argument for constitutional democracy. Because constitutional democracies
combine constitutional rights, democratic representation, and other checks and
balances, they can prevent both the tyranny of one and the tyranny of themajority.
This helps provide public justifications for political decisions because such pro-
cedures are perceived as fair (Rawls 2001, p. 26). This is why governments are the
best means to accommodate pluralism and reach legitimate agreements. Without
such a legitimacy test, no one can claim to act on behalf of “justice” or “the public
good”, they can only claim to act on behalf of their own subjective belief. In Rawls’
words: “a liberal political conception… is not reasonable in the first place unless it
generates its own support in a suitable way by addressing each citizen’s reason…
Only so is it an account of political legitimacy as opposed to an account of how
those who hold political power can satisfy themselves in the light of their own
convictions that they are acting properly” (Rawls 2001, p. 186).
Objection: An objection consists in arguing that expert philosophers or
business ethicists could anticipate what conception of justice or free speech is
likely to generate a legitimate agreement before it goes through democratic pro-
cesses. Experts could therefore tell us what are morally adequate restrictions of
speech on social media. Once they have spoken, everyone can self-regulate
following the experts’ moral judgment. This is why Weinberg claims that we
should “separate this picture of the just society from the means (the agency) by
which it is achieved. This will leave the theory open to a range of possible agents of
justice that may contribute to the realization of that theory’s picture of the just
society” (Weinberg 2009, p. 322).
A response to this objection relies on a crucial condition for the legitimacy of
public decisions: the principle of publicity (Gosseries 2017). To be legitimate,
public decisions, especially about basic rights such as free speech, should be open
to everyone’s scrutiny to make sure that agreed principles are adequately inter-
preted and implemented in practice and to hold decision-makers accountable
when they are not. Democratic administrations are, in many cases, the most
legitimatemeans to realize a just society because democratic processes and checks
and balances can offer guarantees of publicity and freedom of information, as well
as a wealth of experience and judicial decisions to adjudicate conflicts between
rights in a way demonstrably consistent with agreed principles embodied in the
law (Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020).
In the specific case of AI, a first worry with self-regulation in the AI industry
has to do with what is often called “AI transparency”. AI systems are often
opaque because machine learning algorithms make decisions according to
principles that are sometimes obscure even to programmers and certainly to
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external stakeholders (Cambridge Consultants 2019; Gorwa, Binns, and Kat-
zenbach 2020; Sander 2020). But this problem could eventually be solved by
technological progress in “explainable” artificial intelligence (XAI) to secure
better transparency in algorithmic decision-making (Andrus, Bhatt, and Xiang
2020; Diakopoulos 2020; Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020).
A second worry concerns the transparency of businesses themselves. To make
sure that businesses like Facebook adequately implement agreed principles of jus-
tice, such as free speech in contentmoderation, and to hold them accountablewhen
they do not, they must subject their use of AI systems to public scrutiny and inde-
pendent audit (Gorwa, Binns, and Katzenbach 2020; Kroll 2020; Yeung, Howes, and
Pogrebna 2020). Making sure that we hold decision-makers accountable is impor-
tant to comfort everyone in the knowledge that no one can impose their personal
beliefs or interests to the detriment of others (Baumol 1974; Rawls 2001, p. 186). To
this end, governments must impose transparency standards and independent
oversight on all private agents (Kroll 2020; Sander 2020).
To conclude, following legitimate principles when designing AI systems to
automate content moderation on social media is important to protect free speech.
Legitimacy is also important in other areas of value-sensitive design. Examples
include defining acceptable ways to use algorithmic profiling and targeting in
political and commercial advertising (O’Neil 2016; Sander 2020), identifying
demeaning gender and racial stereotypes to avoid reproducing or amplifying them
through search engines and recommendation algorithms (Llansó et al. 2020) or
selecting the relevant definition of fairness when tackling algorithmic bias and
discrimination. As Zimmermann, Di Rosa, and Kim (2020) sum up, “we need
greater democratic oversight of AI not just fromdevelopers and designers, but from
all members of society.”
3.2 Stable Compliance and AI Safety
AI safety is another important area of AI ethics. Indeed, the safe development of AI
systems requires a variety of safeguards from privacy protection and fairness
guarantees in algorithmic decision-making, to meaningful human control of
automated weapon systems, to making sure that learning algorithms that could
continue to evolve in unpredictable ways after delivery remain safe for use over
time (Andrus, Spitzer, and Xiang 2020; Hassabis 2018).
Case: The challenge of AI safety can be illustrated in the case of privacy
protection. Learning algorithms often have to be trained on extensive amounts of
data, which fuels AI firms’ thirst for personal data. For example, in 2017 the UK
Information Commissioner’s Office ruled that the transfer of the personal data of
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1.6 million patients from a London hospital to DeepMind failed to comply with the
UK’s Data Protection Act (Hern 2017). One particularly interesting piece of privacy
regulation is the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) because of
the importance it gives to individual consent. Article 6 allows processing personal
data for any one of six reasons, including “free, informed, and unambiguous
consent” by individuals (European Union 2020). One positive aspect of that
regulation is that Article 5 specifies general principles applying even when data
subjects give their consent that happen to include conditions akin to Helen Nis-
senbaum’s famous principle of “contextual integrity”, which requires respecting
the context inwhich data subjects have consented to disclose personal information
(Nissenbaum 1998). Even when data subjects give their consent, the transparency
and purpose limitation principles specify that data must be processed by busi-
nesses in a transparent way and only for the legitimate purposes specified
explicitly to the data subject when they collected it, the data minimization prin-
ciple specifies that they should collect and process only asmuch data as necessary
for the purposes specified, and other principles of storage limitation, integrity and
confidentiality prevent businesses from shifting the data to third parties (volun-
tarily or not), notably bymandating efforts to prevent data breaches and accidental
loss (European Union 2020).
Yet, the GDPR allows businesses to process personal data as soon as there is
free, informed and unambiguous consent. This is a problem for two main reasons.
First, because AI systems also increase the capacity to analyze data already dis-
closed by consenting individuals to uncover new information that they did not
intend to disclose, not only about themselves but also about un-consenting people
“like them”. For example, governments or businesses can use facial recognition
systems and existing social media pictures to predict every individual’s sexual
orientation, they can use criminality and poverty data in a given zip code to guess
an individual’s recidivism or credit default risk, or even use shopping habits to find
outwhether their customers are pregnant (Duhigg 2012; O’Neil 2016; Zimmermann,
Di Rosa, and Kim 2020). This is why Fairfield and Engel claim that privacy is a
public good and that “your privacy is not yours alone”. Today, being cautious
about disclosing your own data is not enough to secure your privacy, you can also
be vulnerable merely because others have been careless with their data. As a
result, “protection requires group coordination” to secure the “optimal level of
privacy” in society as a whole (Fairfield and Engel 2015, p. 387, p. 424).
Second, the emphasis on consent is also a problem because there are other
reasons to protect privacy beyond the obligation to respect individual choices. As
Solove notes, when governments collect and process large amounts of personal
information in unaccountable ways, “it creates a power imbalance between in-
dividuals and the government …This issue is not about whether the information
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gathered is something people want to hide, but rather about the power and the
structure of government” (Solove 2007, p. 767). Both governments and businesses
can acquire disproportionate power in this way. Governments can use facial
recognition to spot and target leaders of democratic protests and engage in
widespread surveillance with chilling effects on public discourse (Fairfield and
Engel 2015; Powers and Ganascia 2020). Political parties can team up with data
analytics firms like Cambridge Analytica to engage in digital tracking, profiling,
and targeting which are powerful tools to influence electoral outcomes and shape
public policy (Manheim and Kaplan 2019; Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020).
Businesses can uncover information about employees to target union leaders,
track “labor organizing threats”, or discriminate against protected groups, and
they can use advances in behavioral science tomanipulate customers (Ajunwa and
Schlund 2020; Duhigg 2012; Franceschi-Bicchierai 2020). The resulting power
imbalances threaten the protection of principles of justice and democracy such as
political equality and non-domination. Therefore, determining the optimal level of
privacy is a controversial issue and could imply having to collectively decide what
level is necessary to limit power imbalances between powerful governments or
businesses and powerless citizens.
Institutionalist argument: The important point from an institutionalist
perspective is that the protection of principles of justice and, in this case, an
optimal level of privacy should be a stable feature of society. Governments are, in
many cases, the best agents to realize this end. The argument is that they are often
better than private agents (even when well-intentioned) at building safe coercive
mechanisms to secure stable compliance. To understand why, we need first to
understand why stability matters and, second, why governments are able to build
safer coercive mechanisms.
First, the stability of justice requires guarantees of stable compliance. As
Rawls (2001) argues, society is truly just only when public institutions guaran-
teeing justice and, in our example, privacy are stable over time. These institutions
should not be stablemerely because the ones in power are able to impose their will
on others, they should be stable because they create the conditions for their own
support and citizens living under them “acquire a reasoned and informed alle-
giance to those institutions sufficient to render them stable” (Rawls 2001, p. 185).
One condition to create the right kind of stability is the legitimacy of decision
procedures, for instance the legitimacy of the decision regarding the optimal level
of privacy to protect in society (Rawls 2001, p. 186). Another condition is that
institutions must generate the expectation that they will always treat people
equally, that justice will be served predictably, and that they will not suddenly
subject citizens to arbitrary power, domination, and injustice, for example, that
they will not suddenly lose their privacy protection. This disposes citizens to
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further support and trust social institutions (Rawls 2001, p. 196). In order to create
the right kind of stability, therefore, fair treatment or the protection of privacy
cannot merely be punctual properties of social institutions that can disappear
overnight, they must be a permanent and predictable feature. This is why in-
stitutions making sure that everyone, including public officials and business
leaders, reliably complies with collective rules are necessary to create a truly just
society (Rawls 2001, p. 180–198). By contrast, making justice or the protection of
privacy rely on the benevolence of people in power would fail to prevent the risk of
domination and abuse of power. Indeed, even if a “kind” and “responsible” slave
owner does not use their power to harm their slaves at a given point in time but, as
slaves, they remain powerless and under the risk of harm, so they remain unjustly
dominated. Therefore, society cannot be just without establishing guarantees
against abuses of power, both in government and in business, that secure legal
recourse to prevent the backsliding of protections over time (Anderson 2017; Rawls
1993, p. 269; Rawls 2001, p. 53).
Second, public institutions are often better than private actors at securing
stable compliance. While the stability of just institutions and the respect for pri-
vacy regulation over time cannot merely rely on coercion, there are nevertheless
legitimate justifications for introducing coercive mechanisms and sanctions to
prevent injustice and non-compliance. Joseph Heath underlines the importance of
self-binding rules. Individuals engaged in a cooperative effort, even when they
have the best intentions, can nevertheless be subjected to dynamic preference
inconsistency: We may have a general preference for doing what is right, and yet
we are sometimes tempted to act in self-serving ways. Therefore, willingly
accepting to constrain our own future choices is sometimes rational if we want to
reliably attain our collective goals (Heath 2006, p. 324). Yet, if we are to allow some
powerful organizations to impose large-scale self-binding rules, we have to do it
safely by instituting constraints on power and checks and balances.1 With this in
mind, government should be preferred over private agents when it comes to
imposing self-binding rules, not only because they can effectively coerce everyone
(Simon 2000) but also because they can often do so more safely. They can create
legal safeguards and checks and balances to prevent potential abuses of power
and arbitrary interference by the people in charge (Friedman 1970).
Objection: A potential objection consists in questioning such a pessimistic
conception of human nature. We should perhaps trust that most public officials
1 As James Madison once wrote: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition… It may be a
reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If
men were angels, no government would be necessary” (Federalist 51, cited in Waldron 2012).
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and business leaders have good intentions. Perhaps the tech giants mean it when
they claim to be concerned about their users’ privacy. A response is that failure to
comply with our moral or legal obligations does not always derive from evil in-
tentions but from conflicting moral obligations, situations where there is no good
outcome, or weakness of the will. Therefore, even well-intentioned people can be
subjected to dynamic preference inconsistency and fail to comply with their ob-
ligations. Among factors explaining non-compliance, there is value pluralism it-
self and the prevalence of the belief that we have a greater moral responsibility for
what we do ourselves than for what we merely fail to prevent. Another is that our
motivation tends to dwindle when doing the right thing demands a substantial
personal sacrifice. Some could also doubt the effectiveness of such personal sac-
rifice, especially if they doubt that others will comply with their obligations.
Finally, if free-riding is the norm, people tend to follow the crowd even when
compliance would be mutually beneficial (Heath 2014, p. 294–321; Scheffler and
Munoz-Dardé 2005, p. 230–232). For example, despite all their talk about benefi-
cial, inclusive, and responsible AI, many large tech companies engage in tax
avoidance schemes and fail to comply with the minimum requirement of paying
their fair share of taxes (Dietsch 2011, 2015; Reuters 2019).
In the case of businesses, in particular, their capacity to reliably do the right
thing (e.g. to protect privacy) is limited because of structural constraints, like
competition, that often force them to focus on short-term profits and imitate their
competitors’ harmful behavior. In fact, there are good normative reasons to put
firms in competitive environments: Well-designed competitive markets allow for
lower prices, provide incentives to invest in innovation, and allocate resources
efficiently by decentralizing economic decisions through the price system, which
produces economic benefits (Heath 2014, p. 25–36). But as a result of competition,
firms have a limited capacity to be agents of justice and are incentivized to engage
in regulatory arbitrage and to exploit loopholes in regulation (Baumol 1974; Slee
2020; Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020). While many business leaders and
ethicists still believe that CSR is always good for business, David Vogel (2005)
argues that no systematic link between “good behavior” and “profit” can be
empirically established. If Google, Apple, Facebook, and other visible firms well-
known by customers, can sometimes use ethical initiative in marketing, small
firmsmay not have this option. Even when businesses can strategically profit from
ethical behavior, incentives are structured in a way that pushes them to pursue
ethical goals only up to the point necessary to reach their strategic goal, but not
further. Finally, while Vogel himself believes that there is a “market for virtue”, he
underlines that bad practices still pay. Thismeans that, sooner or later, many firms
have to choose between ethics and profit, and structural economic constraints
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often lead them to choose profit. This is why he insists that “governments remain
essential to improving corporate behavior” (Vogel 2005, p. 170).
To conclude, with the rise of AI and data analytics, it is important to secure
stable compliance with privacy regulations to secure an optimal level of privacy
and avoid the power imbalances that would result from a sub-optimal level of
privacy protection. Stability is also important in other areas of AI safety. An
example is AI fairness and bias in algorithmic decision-making. There is empirical
evidence that machine learning algorithms fed with biased data can replicate
historical injustice. Even accurate algorithms can perpetuate existing injustices if
they operate in societies with severe background injustices because they more
accurately target marginalized people and exclude them from social advantages.
For example, algorithms can help decide an individual’s eligibility to entitlements
and benefits, including housing, social security, and bank loans based on their risk
profile, so accurate algorithms could actually make social exclusion even worse.
The result is that AI systems can helpmaintain inequalities of wealth and power in
society (Gebru 2020; O’Neil 2016; Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020; Zimmer-
mann, Di Rosa, and Kim 2020). Securing stable compliance with anti-
discrimination rules is important to avoid the backsliding of protection against
domination and resulting power imbalances. This cannot rely on industry self-
regulation but must rely on adequate regulation and reliable enforcement.
3.3 Efficiency and AI’s Distributive Impact
AI systems are also likely to impact the future of work and distributive inequalities
in society. While there is some unwarranted alarmism in this area, even industry
actors acknowledge that “AI is poised to reshape the global economy and change
the makeup of the skills required to succeed in it. The burden of adjusting to these
changes is placed by default on those who have the fewest resources to bear it”
(Klinova 2020). Therefore, we should investigate how tomake sure that AI systems
are implemented in a way that contributes to an inclusive economy.
Case: The challenge of making sure that AI systems contribute to an inclusive
economy can be illustrated by the complexity of evaluating their distributive
impact. To begin, AI systems will push further the process of work automation,
which is not new and could have positive distributive effects thanks to the overall
productivity gains of Schumpeterian creative destruction (Schumpeter [1950]
2008; Stiglitz 2018). Indeed, just like any technological innovation, AI systemswill
lead to the destruction of previous business models and their replacement with
more productive ones. If productivity gains are redistributed, everyone can benefit
from this process. However, this will also restructure entire labor markets and
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types of work, as Amazon didwith retail. Oneworry is that AI systems are now able
to replace not only less qualifiedworkers like truck drivers but also highly qualified
workers such as lawyers and radiologists. (Indeed, AI systems are now able to find
loopholes in contracts and read magnetic resonance images.) While such tech-
nology could augment the productivity of workers or change their task composi-
tion, they could also de-professionalize jobs because poorly-paid, less qualified
workers with AI systems could outperform current professionals. In the long run,
this process could still improve the productivity of the economy, but how labor
market restructuration will impact wages and unemployment depends on how
productivity gains are distributed, which depends on government policy (Moradi
and Levy 2020; Stiglitz 2018).
One problem is that workers losing their jobs or relocating because of
degrading working conditions have to bear important transition costs over the
short term. A mitigating strategy involves Keynesian economic policies to absorb
these costs collectively, like unemployment benefits, retraining programs to
improve labor skills, and public investments to create new jobs (Keynes [1936]
2001; Moradi and Levy 2020; Stiglitz 2018). Yet, the expected pace of automation
could make this strategy less effective, especially for poorer countries that cannot
afford social benefits and retraining programs, and could be confronted with
premature deindustrialization, inwhich countries start to lose theirmanufacturing
jobs before they had the chance to properly develop or transition towards a service
economy (Rodrik 2015).
Besides automation, the development of AI systems can increase distributive
inequalities in various other ways. One problem is access: While AI systems are
expected to help individuals in various ways (e.g. improve risk mitigation in
financial decisions and personalize education to help kids learn in schools), un-
equal access to these technologies could increase existing socio-economic in-
equalities. Another problem is risk-shifting: Businesses can use AI to predict more
accurately fluctuating consumer demand and then shift this risk onto workers by
scheduling on-call or split shifts, and generally more precarious and unstable
schedules. An important problem is the monopolistic tendencies in the ownership
of the technology itself and the infrastructure necessary to runAI systems: This can
lead to market power inequality in the tech industry and increase inequalities in
society. Therefore, how we choose to organize and regulate the use of these
technologies and how we design taxes and benefits will make a difference in the
distributive impact of AI (Moradi and Levy 2020; Stiglitz 2018).
Institutionalist argument: The important point from an institutionalist
perspective is that realizing a just distribution of resources and, in this case,
mitigating the distributive impact of AI should be done as efficiently as possible.
Governments are, in many cases, the best agents to realize this end. The argument
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is that they are often better than private agents (even when well-intentioned) at
centralizing information to coordinate the kind of collective action required to
realize a just distribution of resources. Private agents with the best intentions are
still more likely to face coordination failure. To understand why, we must first
discuss the importance of centralized information and coordination to realize
distributive justice and, second, why governments are often better at this than
private agents.
First, centralizing information is crucial to realizing a just distribution of re-
sources. As Joseph Heath (2006, p. 315–316) notes, “much of contemporary social
contract theory has been marked by… a tacit conceptual privileging of gains from
trade as the primary mechanism of cooperative benefit.” Instead, he underlines
that social cooperation can produce efficiency gains in various other ways, such as
economies of scale, risk pooling, and information transmission (Heath 2006, p.
319–322, p. 327). In particular, when aiming at realizing a just distribution of
resources, information transmission is crucial. This is because we must make sure
that everyone gets their due, no more, no less. This raises at least two challenges.
To begin, if we take the example of a conception of fairness giving some priority to
the worst-off (Rawls 2001), such a principle cannot be realized without centralized
information and coordination because allocating by mistake some resources to
better-off people instead of the worst-off constitutes an injustice. Moreover,
institutional rolesmay require private agents to act inways that do not directly aim
at solving injustices– such as competing in themarket– but endup contributing to
a just society. This means that it is hardly possible to evaluate how just or unjust a
particular action is unless we have a global view of the whole system (Rawls 1993,
p. 267-69; Rawls 2001, p. 54; Scheffler and Munoz-Dardé 2005, p. 249–50). Thus,
information transmission matters both to identifying everyone’s fair share and to
coordinating everyone’s effort at distributing resources fairly.
Second, governments are often better than private agents (even when well-
intentioned) at coordinating the fair distribution of resources. First, they can
centralize information about the actions of all citizens more efficiently (e.g. thanks
to national statistics and tax agencies). This allows them to make accurate judg-
ments about who the worst-off are and how to maximize their situation. Second,
they can design coherent and efficient policies securing everyone’s simultaneous
access to their fair share. Regarding the distributive impact of AI, governments can
regulate tech companies, force them to pay their fair share of taxes, secure ev-
eryone’s fair access to the benefits of AI, and provide workers with the training
necessary to take advantage of the opportunities of the digital economy. In fact, the
superior capacity of governments in coordinating the distribution of resources is a
general problem in business ethics that extends beyond the distributive impact of
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AI. As Vogel (2005, p. x) notes, “while there is a rich tradition of public policy
analysis that evaluates the costs, benefits, and impact of government decisions,
nothing comparable exists for the realmof ‘private policy’ inwhich CSR is located.”
The difficulty to identify how the AI industry can contribute to a fair and inclusive
economy comes from the need to have a global picture of the overall distributive
effect of AI. Therefore, even if we assume that private actors have the best in-
tentions, realizing an inclusive economy cannot be left to uncoordinated private
initiatives but requires adequate public policies to avoid coordination failure.
Finally, there is another sense in which governments can realize justice “more
efficiently”: They allow for a lower “mental load” for each of us. Indeed, they allow
us “to abstract from the enormous complexities of the innumerable transactions of
daily life and frees us from having to keep track of the changing relative positions
of particular individuals” (Rawls 2001, p. 54). Given the scale ofmodern economies
and the complex ways in which new technologies such as AI impact the distri-
bution of resources, gathering the information necessary to know how best to
contribute to distributive justice is too demanding for any single individual or
business and, as Scheffler argues, may simply be beyond their capacity (Scheffler
and Munoz-Dardé 2005, p. 244). Instead, the institutionalist approach and its
division of moral labor allow us to realize the same goal – a fair society – in a less
demanding way. Just institutions relieve us of the mental load of constantly
wondering whether our daily choices contribute or not to social justice (Murphy
1999). For Rawls (1993, p. 269) “if this division of labor can be established, in-
dividuals and associations are then left free to advance their ends more effectively
within the framework of the basic structure, secure in the knowledge that else-
where in the social system the necessary corrections to preserve background jus-
tice are being made.”
Conclusion: Using the institutionalist argument, I assumed premise 1, ac-
cording to which realizing a just society as quickly as possible should be every-
one’s moral priority. The arguments above support premise 2, namely, that
governments, in many cases, are in principle more legitimate, stable, and efficient
than private agents at realizing justice. I noted that institutionalists only need to
demonstrate that public institutions are often better than private agents. Indeed, if
this is true, then premise 3 holds and there is an opportunity cost of relying on
suboptimal methods: Precious time and resources would be wasted on illegiti-
mate, unstable, and inefficient means, which can at best delay justice and at worse
prevent it. Therefore, premise 4, in many cases, helping governments build
adequate regulation should be the ethical priority of all private agents, including
the businesses in the AI industry.
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4 Justice Failure and Businesses’ Obligation to
Help Build AI Regulation
In this section, I respond to an important objection against the institutionalist
approach to AI ethics. Authors in the institutionalist tradition argue that when just
institutions are already in place individuals merely have a duty to maintain them
(Rawls 1971, p. 115; Rawls 2001, p. 201). For example, this means maintaining the
government’s capacity to enforce adequate AI regulation. The claim that this
approach relieves private actors from any responsibilities and is not demanding
enough is misleading because, contra O’Neill (2001, p. 181), institutionalist ap-
proaches ask private agents to actively maintain just institutions, not merely
conform to their demands. Even skeptics of institutionalist approaches, like Porter
(2009), acknowledge that such a duty is very demanding and requires individuals
and businesses to play an active part in public debates and deliberative processes
and to exercise scrutiny over public decisions and regulatory compliance (p. 177).
The real issue arises when institutions are not already just.
While governments may be, in principle, more legitimate, stable, and efficient
than private agents at realizing a just society, they often fail at their task in non-
ideal, real-world circumstances. Abraham Singer (2018, 2019) famously coined the
concept of “justice failure” to refer to these non-ideal circumstances. His argument
is a counterpoint to the idea of the division of moral labor according to which,
within a larger scheme of social cooperation, markets ought to pursue efficiency
and leave the pursuit of justice to governments and the welfare state. He argues
that just as market failures lead to suboptimal efficiency in actual markets, justice
failure leads to suboptimal fairness in actual welfare states (Singer 2018, p. 97). For
example, authoritarian states lack democratic legitimacy and weak states lack the
independence or the effective enforcement capacity necessary to secure public
trust and accountability. Even strong democracies are sometimes ill-equipped to
monitor the industry and secure stable compliance to public regulation, especially
at the global level (O’Neill 2001, p. 182). Finally, governments often lack infor-
mation about the fast-paced evolution of business and technology making regu-
lations ineffective (Néron 2010, 2016, p. 716).
This is a particular iteration of a long-standing debate in political philosophy
regarding “non-ideal theory” (Valentini 2012). There are variousways to understand
“ideal” and “non-ideal” circumstances that I cannot fully summarize here. For the
purposes of this article, I want to clarify that I do not call circumstances “ideal”
where all relevant agents comply with the demands of justice applying to them
(Rawls 2001), nor do I call a utopian society “ideal justice” where it is defined
independently of feasibility constraints (Cohen 2003; see alsoValentini 2012, p. 654).
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Inmyview,wemust always accept individuals as they are and, accordingly, think of
institutions as they should be. Even in ideal circumstances, the burdens of judgment
will likely lead to reasonable disagreements about what is right and wrong (Rawls
2001, p. 35), and conflicts of values and interests, weakness of thewill, and dynamic
preference inconsistency will remain (Heath 2006, p. 324). Therefore, we must
define just institutions while keeping in mind the possibility of non-compliance as
well as realistic feasibility constraints. This is why, even in a just society, we still
need a constitution and checks and balances to prevent abuses of power by gov-
ernment officials, a judicial system to adjudicate conflicts, and protections of the
rule of law. This is also why we must accept that corporations face competitive
constraints that limit their capacity to engage in corporate social responsibility. This
would be unnecessary if we assumed a society of angels. Instead, I define circum-
stances as “ideal” where institutions are designed adequately to realize justice and
circumstances as “non-ideal” where there is “justice failure”, that is, governments
are failing at realizing justice (Singer 2018, p. 97).
Under this definition, ideally, when public institutions are just, most of us
can focus on doing business while respecting the law. But in non-ideal, real-
world circumstances, when institutions are unfair, absent, or ineffective, the
nature of our ethical obligations change. We can no longer be content with
following the law but we should take on more responsibility in realizing a just
society. On this ground, some object that the institutionalist approach cannot
guide individuals in non-ideal circumstances (O’Neill 2001, p. 182). This is
particularly relevant to discussions on AI and new technologies because, until
regulations are adequately updated, businesses seem to have no choice but to
self-regulate.
An institutionalist response is that we also have a duty to help build just
institutions when they do not already exist (Hsieh 2009; Rawls 1971, p. 115; Rawls
2001, p. 201). But, contra Berkey (2016, p. 732), the fact that governments some-
times fall short is not a green light to the individualist approach. Instead, the same
reasons justifying why governments are, in principle, the best instruments to
realize justice should continue to guide agents in non-ideal circumstances and
justify that the best strategy and top priority should be to build just institutions as
quickly as possible. In the business sector, this means that firms should get
involved in the political process and engage in political CSR (Baumol 1974; Hsieh
2009; Néron 2010, 2016; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Singer 2019). As Vogel (2005)
points out, “corporate responsibility should be about more than going ‘beyond
compliance’; it must also include efforts to raise compliance standards. In fact, the
most critical dimension of corporate responsibility may well be a company’s
impact on public policy. A company’s political activities typically have far broader
social consequences than its own practices” (p. 171). Therefore, the institutionalist
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approach can continue to provide ethical guidance to private agents in the AI
industry even in case of justice failure: Helping governments build adequate AI
regulation should often be their ethical priority in non-ideal circumstances.
Legitimacy: The AI industry must first help improve government’s legitimacy
by contributing to improving the transparency, oversight, and accountability of
the regulatory process. When the countries in which they operate lack legitimate
administrations, they should get involved in the political process, helping citizens
in establishing just democratic procedures, supporting the development of a
thriving civil society, and fighting corruption (Hsieh 2009, p. 260–64; Singer 2019,
p. 244; Vogel 2005, p. 171–173). Even in well-functioning democracies, the AI
industry can support public debates by encouraging stakeholder consultation in
the regulatory process. They can do so by providing public officials, academics,
and civil society with the opportunities, resources, and information necessary to
engage in effective discussions about AI regulation. Good examples are the global
Partnership onAI, announced in 2016 and now gathering all big tech companies as
well as members of academia and civil society, or the Royal Society’s initiative in
the UK, You and AI, supported by DeepMind in 2018, which provided an oppor-
tunity for public debate on AI (Hassabis 2018). But improving the legitimacy of
public regulation also requires powerful actors such as Google, Amazon, Face-
book, Apple, and Microsoft to refrain from activities that make governments less
legitimate, such as financing political campaigns, using economic threats to
promote self-serving regulation, or engaging in corruption (Baumol 1974; Singer
2019, p. 245).
Stability: The AI industry must help governments secure stable compliance.
One way consists in supporting binding “hard” legislation, instead of self-
regulation, which has a greater impact by guaranteeing the compliance of entire
industries rather than only self-regulating firms (Baumol 1974; Hsieh 2009, p. 269;
Vogel 2005). Businesses should also gather data about the performance of their AI
systems before and after deployment to help the government monitor compliance
with public standards (Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020). And while businesses
should refrain from pushing self-serving agendas, when democracy itself is at risk,
businesses could condition further investment on the establishment of democratic
safeguards. Indeed, one way in which businesses can exercise pressure on gov-
ernments is through the exercise of their property rights: “A firmmightmove out of
a state in response to the passage of a law it does not favor, or it may threaten to
move out of a state if such a law is passed. This may cause the state’s citizens to
revise or edit their political decisions” (Moriarty 2016; see also Hsieh 2009).
Efficiency: The AI industry must finally help governments implement more
efficient policies. To begin, they should simply pay their taxes to help fund
effective retraining programs and generous enough social benefits to collectively
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absorb the transition costs generated by disruptive AI technologies (Singer 2019;
Stiglitz 2018). But businesses should also participate positively in lawmaking by
offering valuable information about the AI systems they are developing to help
anticipate potential ethical issues and find technical and regulatory solutions.
Indeed, a problem facing governments is that regulation is slow-moving and can
struggle to keep up with the fast-paced development of AI and new technology in
general. This is already true in ideal circumstances and the problem worsens in
non-ideal circumstances. Therefore, the AI industry may have an obligation to
cooperate with governments to anticipate potential problems raised by new
technologies in order to update legislation in time. AI firms such as DeepMind
already have an Ethics & Society unit running initiatives of this sort (Hassabis
2018). The AI industry can also help governments find loopholes or update obso-
lete legislation (Dignum2020; Yeung,Howes, andPogrebna 2020). AsNéron (2016)
notes, “regulatory systems are sometimes slow to evolve and adapt to complex and
rapid changes, especially in some industries producing innovative technologies.
Facing change and complexity, governments and regulatory bodies need to work
in partnership with industry’s key actors, and sometimes rely heavily on industry
research and information” (p. 716).
Therefore, in non-ideal circumstances, the first-best strategy and top priority
for businesses and other private agents should often consist in supporting legiti-
mate government intervention and improving regulation as quickly as possible.
Only when the first-best strategy is no longer possible can the second-best strategy
become permissible as a last resort: using suboptimal means such as self-
regulation. Even then, when collaboration with governments is not possible and
only self-regulation remains, private agents should aim at improving legitimacy,
stability, and efficiency.
Legitimacy: AI industry leaders should set aside their own moral beliefs and
follow legitimate public guidelines. Examples include the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights or the United Nations’ Global Compact, which provide guidelines
for corporations regarding human rights, working conditions, corruption, and the
environment. The Global Compact Board has some legitimacy by being constituted
of people representing the United Nations members, businesses, civil society, and
unions. In the case of AI ethics, in particular, similar international deliberative
processes have produced best practices standards for the responsible development
of artificial intelligence (on AI governance by human rights-centered design, see
Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020). Examples include UNESCO’s global consul-
tation on AI and the Montreal Declaration for the Responsible Development of
Artificial Intelligence. Involving stakeholders affected by AI systems in the delib-
erative process is one way to improve firms’ legitimacy in private governance and
self-regulation (Dignum 2020; Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020).
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Stability: AI businesses should create self-binding mechanisms within their
ownorganization, including impact assessment, independentoversight, verification
and accountability mechanisms, and internal sanctions (Kroll 2020, p. 181–196;
Vogel 2005, p. 164). Yet, voluntary self-regulation remains unstable since the
operation of market forces disincentivizes business organizations to comply with
their own ethical standards, unless proper oversight mechanisms hold decision-
makers accountable and impose consequences for non-compliance (Slee 2020;
Yeung, Howes, and Pogrebna 2020).
Efficiency: Finally, while AI businesses should directly support new regula-
tions, in the meantime, they can also pave the way through self-regulation by
following the rules expected in upcoming legislation. This can facilitate the swift
adoption and implementation of future regulations (Néron 2016, p. 716; Vogel
2005, p. 168–173). Moreover, when they engage in self-regulation or corporate
social responsibility in particularly burdened societies, they should focus on ini-
tiatives on which they have the most information and coordination capacity and
take seriously the responsibility to act in coordination with other businesses and
civil society in order to put people at the centre of development efforts, build local
capacity (Hsieh 2009, p. 263–264) and avoid pulling in different directions or
stopping collective efforts that can delay the realization of justice.
Conclusion: While governments often remain the first-best option to imple-
ment ethical standards in the AI industry, in non-ideal circumstances well-
intentioned private actors can offer a valuable contribution, either by helping
build just public institutions or, when this is not possible, by abiding by voluntary
ethical standards. That many private actors are well-intentioned does not mean
that they can easily realize justice on their own, because they are not in the best
position to secure legitimate standards, stable compliance, and efficient collective
coordination. This is why they should channel their efforts into political action and
collaborate with governments, because social justice is often best served when
voluntary standards become legally binding (Vogel 2005, 163).
5 Conclusion
I argued that the institutionalist approach in philosophy and business ethics can
provide useful guidance to business actors and practitioners in the AI industry. I
concluded that, in many important cases, helping governments build adequate
regulation should be the ethical priority of private agents, including businesses in
the AI industry. The ethical framework presented here differs from other authors in
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two important ways. On the one hand, I propose that business actors like the AI
industry should help build just institutions when they do not exist. Therefore, I
agree to some extent with Abraham Singer’s “justice failure” approach, which
claims that businesses have a larger set of political obligations (Singer 2018)
compared to authors proposing to restrict firms’ political obligations to tackling
market failures (Baumol 1974; Heath 2014). Focusing on a market failures
approach allegedly identifies clearer goals for firms’ political behavior (Néron
2016, p. 725), but in a pluralistic society people have different values and interests,
including about the role that markets should play in society, so promoting
perfectly competitive markets is not necessarily clearer or less controversial. On
the other hand, Singer and others argue that firms have a large variety of ethical
obligations and special duties towards stakeholders and believe that political
duties are only one obligation among others social and distributive duties
(Moriarty 2016; Néron 2010; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Singer 2019). I argued
instead that, in many cases, the priority of AI businesses leading the fourth in-
dustrial revolution should be to cooperate with governments and international
bodies to improve public regulation, except in exceptional circumstances when
this first-best strategy is impossible and self-regulation is the only option.
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